Replace Andmore ID SSO with local login
fitme3070.pt delegated all authentication to hub.andmore.pt: views/auth/*
were bounce stubs, and because this domain is outside the .andmore.pt cookie
scope the real handoff was a one-time HTTPS ticket redeem. Bring identity back
in-house — passwords live in users.password_hash, which the SSO migration
never dropped.
Removed: config/sso.php, IDENTITY_MODE, every SSO_* constant and env key,
identity_is_federated() and the cookie/ticket paths in the auth views and the
public-site bootstrap. ANDMORE_ID_URL stays — it is still the hub /notify
endpoint for outbound email/SMS, which the reset mails ride on, and has
nothing to do with authentication now.
Added, ported from the fotografia.andmore.pt sibling rather than invented:
- auth_login() with transparent password_needs_rehash upgrades and the
last_login trail; auth_register_client(); auth_set_password(); the
single-use 2h reset tokens.
- Real login / register / forgot_password / reset_password pages on a new
anonymous shell (includes/auth_header.php). includes/header.php renders
the backoffice sidebar and a logout button, which is wrong for a visitor
who is not signed in yet.
- safe_return_path(), so a crafted ?return_to= cannot bounce a freshly
authenticated user off-site.
- Per-IP throttling on login, register and reset-request. Successes count
too, so a guessed password cannot be parlayed into stuffing the rest of
the user list from the same IP.
- views/user/set_password.php: admin override for anyone whose email is
undeliverable. Prefers mailing an invite link so the backoffice never
handles the password. A plain admin cannot act on a sysadmin, and nobody
can use it on themselves — self-service goes through profile.php, which
demands the current password so a hijacked session cannot lock the owner
out.
Accounts provisioned during the SSO era have password_hash NULL. They get in
via the reset email, or by registering again with the same address:
auth_register_client() claims a passwordless row, but only a plain `client`
one, so knowing a staff address does not let anyone self-assign the role.
users.andmore_id is deliberately left in place. No code reads it any more, but
it records which central identity each row was linked to.
Deployment: apply database/migration_20260913_local_auth.sql (password_resets
+ auth_attempts) in the SAME sysadmin session that pulls this commit — the
forgot-password flow needs that table, and after the pull a login requires a
local password.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -25,40 +25,15 @@ DB_PASS=
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BACKUP_TOKEN=replace_me
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BACKUP_KEEP_DAYS=7
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# ─── Identity / Andmore ID ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# federated — auth is delegated to id.andmore.pt; the am_sso cookie + central
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# sso_sessions/users tables drive login. This site is part of the ecosystem, so
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# federated is the expected mode (standalone disables all SSO traffic).
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IDENTITY_MODE=federated
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# Slug identifying this install on andmore_id.linked_platforms.
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PLATFORM_SLUG=fitme3070
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# When true (federated): a register/login fails loudly if the central DB is
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# unreachable, instead of creating an orphan local row. True on prod.
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IDENTITY_REQUIRE_UPSTREAM=false
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# Andmore hub central service URL.
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# ─── Andmore hub (notifications only) ────────────────────────────────────────
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# This install owns its own login: passwords live in users.password_hash and
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# views/auth/login.php is a real form. The Andmore ID / SSO delegation was
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# removed — no IDENTITY_MODE, no SSO_* keys, no central sso_sessions table.
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#
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# ANDMORE_ID_URL stays only because outbound email/SMS is still relayed through
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# the hub's /notify endpoint (see NOTIFY_API_KEY below).
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ANDMORE_ID_URL=https://hub.andmore.pt/
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# Direct DB credentials for the central Andmore ID database (federated mode).
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SSO_DB_HOST=
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SSO_DB_PORT=
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SSO_DB_NAME=andmore_id
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SSO_DB_USER=
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SSO_DB_PASS=
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# Parent domain the am_sso cookie is scoped to. Must match id.andmore.pt.
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SSO_COOKIE_DOMAIN=.andmore.pt
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# Override per environment (e.g. am_sso_dev on dev) so prod/dev cookies on the
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# shared parent domain don't clobber each other.
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SSO_COOKIE_NAME=am_sso
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SSO_SESSION_TTL_DAYS=30
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# When true (federated): unauthenticated users are sent straight to
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# id.andmore.pt. Leave false during the member migration, flip true after.
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SSO_REQUIRED=false
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# ─── Notificações centralizadas (id.andmore.pt /notify) ──────────────────────
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# App key for POST {ANDMORE_ID_URL}notify/send. Minted on id.andmore.pt →
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# Notificações → Chaves de app.
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