- Política de privacidade reescrita: tabela de dados/finalidades/fundamento
(inclui os pedidos de aula, inscrição e eventos com IP), prazos concretos,
subcontratantes, Google Maps e reviews, cookies. Termos e condições novos
(/home/termos), no rodapé e no sitemap. Campos [ENTRE PARÊNTESES RETOS]
e revisão por jurista pendentes antes de publicar no domínio real.
- Google Maps só carrega ao carregar em «Mostrar mapa» (map_click_to_load);
as fotos dos autores das reviews são guardadas pelo servidor em
uploads/reviews/ e servidas localmente (review_avatar_url).
- Retenção que a política declara, aplicada pelo cron (04:00): leads com
mais de 12 meses → lixeira; blocked_submissions e outbox de segurança
apagados aos 90 dias (trash_retention_sweep, auditado).
- Backoffice e login com tema claro/escuro/automático: data-bs-theme
aplicado no <head> antes do CSS (sem flash), escolha em localStorage,
segue o sistema em tempo real, color-scheme e theme-color para os dois.
Cores próprias passaram a variáveis do Bootstrap. lang="pt-PT".
Testado numa cópia da BD de produção: 72/72 verificações.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
fitme3070.pt delegated all authentication to hub.andmore.pt: views/auth/*
were bounce stubs, and because this domain is outside the .andmore.pt cookie
scope the real handoff was a one-time HTTPS ticket redeem. Bring identity back
in-house — passwords live in users.password_hash, which the SSO migration
never dropped.
Removed: config/sso.php, IDENTITY_MODE, every SSO_* constant and env key,
identity_is_federated() and the cookie/ticket paths in the auth views and the
public-site bootstrap. ANDMORE_ID_URL stays — it is still the hub /notify
endpoint for outbound email/SMS, which the reset mails ride on, and has
nothing to do with authentication now.
Added, ported from the fotografia.andmore.pt sibling rather than invented:
- auth_login() with transparent password_needs_rehash upgrades and the
last_login trail; auth_register_client(); auth_set_password(); the
single-use 2h reset tokens.
- Real login / register / forgot_password / reset_password pages on a new
anonymous shell (includes/auth_header.php). includes/header.php renders
the backoffice sidebar and a logout button, which is wrong for a visitor
who is not signed in yet.
- safe_return_path(), so a crafted ?return_to= cannot bounce a freshly
authenticated user off-site.
- Per-IP throttling on login, register and reset-request. Successes count
too, so a guessed password cannot be parlayed into stuffing the rest of
the user list from the same IP.
- views/user/set_password.php: admin override for anyone whose email is
undeliverable. Prefers mailing an invite link so the backoffice never
handles the password. A plain admin cannot act on a sysadmin, and nobody
can use it on themselves — self-service goes through profile.php, which
demands the current password so a hijacked session cannot lock the owner
out.
Accounts provisioned during the SSO era have password_hash NULL. They get in
via the reset email, or by registering again with the same address:
auth_register_client() claims a passwordless row, but only a plain `client`
one, so knowing a staff address does not let anyone self-assign the role.
users.andmore_id is deliberately left in place. No code reads it any more, but
it records which central identity each row was linked to.
Deployment: apply database/migration_20260913_local_auth.sql (password_resets
+ auth_attempts) in the SAME sysadmin session that pulls this commit — the
forgot-password flow needs that table, and after the pull a login requires a
local password.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
