andreandClaude Opus 5
d5cb50b432
Outbound email was relayed to the hub's /notify endpoint, so this install had
no SMTP configuration of its own and no way to see what had been sent. Bring
delivery back in-house, following the fotografia.andmore.pt stack rather than
inventing a second shape for it.
- Submodule bumped 603ff84 -> ea3616a, the pin fotografia already uses. That
is what provides functions_mail.php (shared transport), functions_settings.php
(platform_smtp_config + encrypted settings) and compat_secrets.php. Verified
no function-name collisions with this repo's own config/functions_settings.php:
platform-tools namespaces everything platform_*.
- PHPMailer 7.1.1 vendored at vendor/PHPMailer/src/. platform_mail_available()
looks for exactly this hand-vendored layout before falling back to composer's
autoloader, so the host needs no shell and no composer install. LGPL-2.1
license text included.
- config/functions_queue.php replaced: was a thin facade over the hub relay,
now fotografia's real queue. Rows are claimed atomically, retried with
exponential backoff up to max_attempts, and park in 'failed' with the real
SMTP rejection in last_error.
- SMTP resolution matches the fleet: .env wins for the SMTP_* constants, while
the actual send goes through platform_smtp_config($pdo), which is DB-first.
That ordering is deliberate -- the database is the half an operator can
change from the backoffice without shell access. Empty SMTP_HOST falls back
to PHP mail().
- Sistema -> Comunicações (views/sysadmin/comms.php): credentials plus a live
SMTP connection test and a verdict on what would happen to a message sent
right now. Secret-valued settings are write-only in the form and encrypted
at rest (AES-256-GCM, key from .env, never in the DB dump). Which keys count
as secret is platform_settings_is_secret()'s decision, not a list kept here.
- Sistema -> Mensagens (views/sysadmin/messages.php): the queue monitor.
Filters, per-message detail with last_error, and retry/cancel/archive.
Retry flushes inline so the operator sees the outcome immediately.
- cron.php drains the queue every 5 minutes, serialised with a lock file, and
runs retention once a day. Over HTTP it answers 404 until CRON_TOKEN is set
to something other than replace_me. Deliberately not a copy of fotografia's
cron: the session-reminder, download-digest and photo-archive steps have no
modules here and would be dead code.
- config/functions_notify_client.php deleted, and ANDMORE_ID_URL with it --
the hub relay was its only caller.
Verified without a database: PHP lint across the tree; PHPMailer builds a full
MIME message with RFC 2047 UTF-8 subject encoding from the three vendored files;
platform_mail_available() finds them; platform_mail_make() returns a correctly
configured mailer; the diagnosis states report Operacional / Não configurado.
NOT verified: the settings encryption round-trip -- this machine's PHP has no
openssl extension, so platform_secret_key() returns null and values pass through
in clear. The code degrades safely (stores the value rather than losing it) and
the Comunicações page warns when the key is unavailable.
Deployment: apply database/migration_20260913_message_queue.sql, set SMTP in
Comunicações or .env, set APP_SECRET_KEY, and schedule cron.php.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
55 lines
2.6 KiB
PHP
55 lines
2.6 KiB
PHP
<?php
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// ─── Secrets stored in system_settings ───────────────────────────────────────
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//
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// SMTP and Twilio credentials are configurable from the backoffice, which means
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// they live in the database. That is a real tradeoff: the nightly job in
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// cron.php keeps 30 database backups, so a plaintext password would sit in
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// every one of them, and anyone who can read a dump would have the mail account.
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//
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// So secret-valued settings are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. The key
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// never goes in the database — it comes from .env, which is not in git and not
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// in the DB dump. A dump on its own is therefore useless for recovering them.
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//
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// The cipher itself is no longer implemented here. It was one of two copies —
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// hub2 had the same AES-256-GCM with a different key derivation, so a value
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// written by one site would not open on the other. There is now a single
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// implementation in shared/platform-tools; this file re-exports the short names
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// (secret_encrypt, secret_decrypt, secret_is_encrypted, secret_mask,
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// secrets_available, SECRET_PREFIX) that the sysadmin pages already call.
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require_once dirname(__DIR__) . '/shared/platform-tools/compat_secrets.php';
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// ─── Read helpers (site-specific, not crypto) ────────────────────────────────
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//
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// NOTE: these give .env precedence over the database, which is the opposite of
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// platform_settings_get(). Deliberate here — an install can pin credentials in
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// the environment and ignore the backoffice entirely — but it is a difference
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// worth remembering when comparing behaviour with the other sites.
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/**
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* Read a secret-valued setting, decrypted.
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*
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* `.env` still wins when set, so an install can keep pinning credentials in the
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* environment and ignore the DB entirely — that is the safer configuration and
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* remains supported.
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*/
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function setting_secret(string $key, string $envKey = '', string $default = ''): string {
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if ($envKey !== '') {
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$fromEnv = (string) env($envKey, '');
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if ($fromEnv !== '') return $fromEnv;
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}
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$stored = (string) setting($key, '');
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return $stored !== '' ? secret_decrypt($stored) : $default;
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}
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/**
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* Read a non-secret setting that may also be pinned in .env.
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* Same precedence as setting_secret(), without the crypto.
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*/
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function setting_or_env(string $key, string $envKey, string $default = ''): string {
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$fromEnv = (string) env($envKey, '');
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if ($fromEnv !== '') return $fromEnv;
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$stored = (string) setting($key, '');
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return $stored !== '' ? $stored : $default;
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}
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